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After ‘Security First’:  An Analysis of 
Security Transition and ‘Statebuilding’ 






ABSTRACT The Palestinian Authority’s (PA) imposition of order after the end of the al-
Aqsa Intifada has been generally interpreted as a success. Not only did the PA consolidate its 
power in the West Bank and restore good relations with Israel and the West, it also appeared 
to obtain popular legitimacy by cracking down on its political opponents. This paper 
discusses the impact of the PA’s imposition of order in Nablus, a town which had endured 
lawlessness and disorder under an Israeli siege (2001-7) and had been the focus of the PA’s 
security agenda. It argues that, though the PA’s security agenda initially enjoyed popular 
consent, this does not demonstrate public endorsement of the PA’s legitimacy. Rather the 
consent that such measures produced was superficial and, in the long term, the acceleration 
of the PA’s shift towards authoritarianism is likely to be profoundly debilitating for 
Palestinian society in general. 
 
 In December 2012, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) achieved an elevation 
in its status to that of a ‘non-member observer state’ at the United Nations General Assembly. 
The President of the PLO, Mahmoud Abbas, presented this move as both the fulfilment of a 
long standing Palestinian right to self-determination and also as a product of a two-year state 
building project that had been undertaken by the Palestinian Authority (PA) since 2009.
1
 In 
broad terms, the statebuilding project appeared to be the kind of solution to the so-called 
‘Palestine Question’ that the world had been waiting for. It adopted an internationally 
recognised framework for a peace settlement based on the creation of an independent 
Palestinian state in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. The PA also eschewed violence, 
prioritised the enforcement of order and embraced a model of liberal economic development.
2
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 Furthermore, the PA’s claim to statehood could be understood as a fulfilment of the 
two-state agenda that had been accepted by both the PLO and Israel during the 1990s. This 
was formalised through a Declaration of Principles signed in 1993 following secret 
negotiations known as the Oslo Accords.
3
 Yet, while prima facie the Oslo Accords appeared 
to offer a path towards a comprehensive peace settlement, in reality these agreements 
entrenched both the power imbalance between Israel and the Palestinians and the material 
structures of Israel’s dominance over life in the occupied territories. In other words, the Oslo 
Accords effectively enabled continuity in Israel’s power over Palestinians in the West Bank4 
and the Gaza Strip through political, economic and security mechanisms with the full legal 
backing of international institutions.
5
  
 The PA itself was created as part of the Oslo Accords. Ostensibly, it was intended to 
serve as an interim government for the Palestinian population while further negotiations 
between Israel and the PLO finalised a peace agreement. However, if this was the real 
purpose of the PA, then it was critically flawed from the outset. These flaws were evident in 
practice as the PA was burdened with most of the responsibilities of government but, at the 
same time, prevented from utilising any of the real powers that would have enabled the 
effective fulfilment of that role.
6
 The government of Israel – the arms of which were manifest 
in the occupied territories through a continuous military presence and the structures of 
occupation and colonisation
7
 – remained the ultimate authority. In other words, the PA served 
as a mechanism for coordinating and containing the Palestinian population without being a 
sovereign body itself. 
 The asymmetrical structure of the Israel-PA relationship was further exacerbated in the 
aftermath of the second major Palestinian uprising beginning in 2000. Known as the al-Aqsa 
Intifada, this came at a time of near total collapse of the PA’s grip on public confidence. 
Further, such was the ferocity of Israel’s military response to the uprising that much of the 
PA’s infrastructure was decimated. Yet, after this particular period of intense hostility had 
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 Israel – supported by the United States and other allies – sought to restore 
the PA as a form of Palestinian self-government contained under a highly restrictive military 
occupation, albeit under different leadership.
9
. In this context of near total containment of 
Palestinian political agency, the very notion of the PA genuinely undertaking steps to build a 
Palestinian state under occupation was clearly questionable.
10
 
 More specifically, the statebuilding project comprised a range of elements that proved 
to be problematic. The most significant of these was the acceleration of an already on-going 
shift towards authoritarianism in the PA’s domestic governance. The particular manner in 
which this authoritarianism manifested itself was twofold. First, it involved the strict 
reassertion of domestic order following the al-Aqsa Intifada (2000-c.2005) and the schism 
between Palestine’s two main political groups, Fatah and Hamas (2006-7). Second, this fierce 
politicisation of policing and security activity was accompanied by the re-enforcement of 
existing social fragmentation, the consequence of which was the disempowerment of broad 
sections of the Palestinian population. 
 Within this context, this article argues that the Palestinian statebuilding project not only 
failed to represent a realistic means of achieving independence from Israel’s domination, but 
also entailed an important element in the acceleration of the PA’s overall shift towards 
authoritarianism. Thus, greater authoritarianism was an inevitable product of the structural 
conditions that constrained and penetrated Palestinian political agency and the statebuilding 
agenda embraced by the PA. In making this argument, this article first engages in a 
theoretical examination of the apparent dichotomy between ‘liberalism’ and 
‘authoritarianism’ in the context of the Palestinian statebuilding project, and maintains that 
neither is entirely applicable to the case of contemporary Palestine. Following from this, it 
seems that Palestine cannot be understood in the traditional ‘post-conflict’ framework. The 
article then outlines the important structural constraints on the PA’s agency with particular 
reference to the issues of ‘security’ and ‘policing’ in relation to the PA’s asymmetrical 
relationship to external actors, and the complex legacy of the PLO as a revolutionary, 
national liberation organisation. It subsequently surveys the recent history of the Palestinian 
political environment by drawing on third party accounts and on field research conducted 
between 2008 and 2011 in the northern West Bank.
11
 This research included participant 
observation, interviews, focus groups and textual analysis, with an added focus on issues of 
policing, security and the impact of economic development policies. The article concludes by 
arguing that the PA’s shift towards authoritarianism has been profoundly debilitating to the 
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prospect of either authentic resistance to Israel’s occupation or meaningful progress towards 
a negotiated peace. 
 
 
Liberalism, Authoritarianism and Statebuilding in the Palestinian Context 
 
 Issues around post-conflict statebuilding have spawned a growing field of literature.
12
 
For the most part, this literature has tended to draw on a variety of case studies in order to 
identify and abstract successful practices.
13
 In general, this has tended to discriminate 
between the practices that simply bring a cessation of violence and those that help to create a 
political environment in which disagreements can be dealt with through established 
institutions rather than armed conflict.
14
 In the terminology utilised by peace theorist Johan 
Galtung, this distinction represents the difference between mere “negative peace” – the 
absence of overt violence – and “ positive peace,” reconciliation based on mutually beneficial 
cooperation and the reduction in structural inequality between antagonists.
15
  
 However, more critical accounts have noted an important mismatch between the goal of 
peace-building and some models of statebuilding. For example, as Menocal notes, despite the 
fact that international institutions such as the United Nations Development Programme and 
the World Bank have essentially embraced a link between “statebuilding” and “peace-
building”, tensions still exist between the two. 16 Specifically, this occurs around the key 
issue of the post-conflict state’s political character.17 That is to say, successfully constructing 
a functioning state may not lead to an outcome of sustainable peace if the nature of the state 
is one which cannot be detached from broader political dynamics that produced, resulted 
from, or perpetuated conflict. Although prima facie, this may seem obvious, the implications 
of this conclusion are indeed quite profound. In short, this suggests that statebuilding is an 
unsuitable path to peace-building when state institutions serve (or appear to serve) the 
interests of one antagonist over others and/or when the state itself fails to counteract existing 
structural inequalities effectively.  
 Indeed, much of the statebuilding literature focuses on evaluating processes evident 
across various case studies according to a positivist set of standards. For example, Paris and 
Sisk refer to “the construction of legitimate, effective government institutions” as a key goal 
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 while Jones and Campbell have considered the importance 
of organisational learning – in other words, the importance of taking account of the specific 
dynamics of a particular conflict – in the pursuit of sustainable peace.19  
 With this observation in mind, the Palestinian Authority, supported by international 
donors, pursued a model of statebuilding directed towards the introduction of an ostensibly 
liberal form of governance. Yet this was conducted under conditions of on-going occupation 
and colonisation by Israel, with the PA being a non-sovereign government with limited 
powers. These statebuilding efforts included attempts to stimulate private sector growth in the 
economy, the utilisation of democratic rhetoric to legitimise policy, and the re-organisation of 
the public sector in accordance with internationally-recognised norms known as ‘good 
governance’.20 Such a range of policies might appear to be the fulfilment of the ideal of 
peace-building – in as much as it comprises the construction of a framework for a liberal and 
democratic society – but liberalising policies are considered ill-suited to genuine progress 
towards peace, as Barnett has pointed out.
21
 Barnett’s alternative to liberal peace-building is 
one based on republican values of  “deliberation, constitutionalism and representation”.22 
However, a more focused analysis of the Palestinian example  suggests that the inadequacy of 
the liberalising approach has instead given way to more authoritarian tendencies. In broad 
terms, as Brown has put forward, this is predicated on the existence of a range of dynamics 
within the PA’s institutional politics which have been similar to those of other Arab states 
during their periods of state-formation at the end of European colonialism. This has allowed 
for the development of crony capitalism and corruption within the dominant classes, and a 
growing gulf between the elites and the general population.
23
  
 Examples of the shift towards greater authoritarianism are also apparent in the context 
of security and policing. As Sayigh suggests, “in the West Bank … the security sector is 
increasingly called on to mediate between the PA government and society.”24 In other words, 
the security forces have accrued greater political power at the expense of the civilian 
leadership of the PA. Further to this, Sayigh also notes the deleterious effects of both the 
partisan nature of the security forces and the lack of any meaningful mechanisms of 
accountability. In particular, he holds that, “in the West Bank, the intelligence agencies are 
emerging as autonomous power centres that acknowledge no higher, constitutional 
authority”.25 This may lead to the serious debilitation of the civilian leadership of the PA. 
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 Lia’s analyses of the PA have identified a range of critical factors that help explain 
some of the background to this authoritarian shift. These include the existence of various 
policing cultures that preceded the formation of the PA and were rooted in the actions and 
structures of the coercive mechanisms of the PLO. Such cultures tended to focus on partisan 
loyalty and self-interest rather than on a more textbook ethos of “public service and 
impartiality”. 26  Ineffective training programmes and the (often half-hearted) efforts by 
international actors to improve these programmes, however, resulted in greater pressure on 
police forces to conform to the concerns of international actors with little positive impact on 
their relations with the general population.
27
 
 In addition to the issues raised by such pre-existing policing cultures, Lia notes that the 
specific context within which the PA security forces operate is unique. The Oslo Accords 
designated the PA security forces as responsible not only for normal domestic policing, but 
also for the safety and security of Israeli interests, including the welfare of Israeli settlers 
within the occupied territories.
28
 The prioritisation of counter-terrorism was added to this by 
influential external actors. Such structures effectively locked the PA into a position of 
inevitable and irrevocable weakness compared to Israel, resulting in an asymmetrical 
structural relationship. As argued by Khan, this arrangement effectively created “an open-
ended period of limbo in which the disengaged territories are neither truly sovereign nor 
technically part of Israel”.29 
 Thus, it is essential to acknowledge that the very nature of the Palestinian statebuilding 
process does not easily fit within existing models. This is for two primary reasons: firstly, 
whether Palestinian statebuilding can even be considered a ‘post-conflict’ process is highly 
contested. As various analyses have pointed out, the background to the initial formation of 
the PA was not one of a comprehensive settlement, nor was it one wherein a relationship 
based on parity between the PA and Israel would be founded.
30
 However, and secondly, the 
manner in which this was put into practice has, in Sayigh’s words, “contributed to systemic, 
probably irreversible collapse – ‘state failure’ – in the Palestinian Authority.”31 This outcome 
was also predicated on the general practices of the donor community which encouraged 
Palestinian dependence on foreign aid while failing to hold Israel to account for its 
disruptions to the peace process. It was further accelerated by a US-led policy designed to 
undermine and overthrow the democratically-elected Hamas government following the 2006 
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 These actions, along with the Fatah leadership’s compliance with 
them, not only demonstrated the insincerity of any claim to democratic legitimacy by the PA, 




 The period following the 2006 elections contributed to the PA’s acceleration towards 
authoritarianism. This was when Hamas was identified as a critical threat to the security of 
Israel, the PA, and the US. The outcome of this determination was that Hamas was 
effectively purged from the West Bank during a period of inter-factional violence – a 
schism
34
 – in 2006-2007. However, various leaked documents suggest that the UK’s Secret 
intelligence Service (SIS) had been planning a PA-led paramilitary campaign against Hamas 
since 2004 and there was a deep level of complicity between the PA security forces and 
foreign clandestine operatives. For example, in the aftermath of this schism, it emerged that 
SIS had assisted PA forces in organising extra-judicial internment for suspected Hamas 
members and that British officers were often present while detainees were being tortured.
35
 It 
is also known that the PA president himself had been personally involved in co-ordinating the 
campaign and working with Israel during this period.
36
 
 Before further analysing the implications of these events on the acceleration of 
authoritarianism under the PA, it is worth reviewing the events that led up to the Hamas-
Fatah schism of 2006-7, as this background information provides important context to the 
discussion on public responses to the ‘statebuilding’ agenda. 
Background to the Schism 
 The schism between Hamas and Fatah (2006-7) established the backdrop for the PA’s 
statebuilding agenda. This was because, once tensions between Hamas and Fatah developed 
into violent confrontation, Fatah – traditionally the dominant party within the PA – was able 
to step away from both the uneasy truce it had endured with Hamas, and using the cover of an 
emergency situation, abandon its observance of democratic limitations on its power. Though 
still confined by Israel’s occupation in the wake of the schism, the PA became freer to align 
itself more directly with the interests and demands of international donors. More specifically, 
the schism made it possible for the PA to openly attack its opponents and undermine the 
legitimacy of any criticisms it faced (at least in the West Bank). At the domestic level, this 
gave the PA greater political freedom to act than it had enjoyed since its formation in the 
1990s. Yet once this freedom was won – albeit at the expense of losing Gaza to Hamas – the 
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PA was able to pursue a statebuilding agenda that followed more-or-less directly a 
framework for development set out by international actors. In order to put this into context, 
this section briefly discusses the development of tensions between Hamas and Fatah prior to 
the split before looking at how the consequences of the schism helped frame the public’s 
response to the statebuilding agenda.  
 Hamas emerged as a significant force in Palestinian politics during the first major 
popular uprising against Israel’s occupation (1987-1993). Alongside its Islamism and fierce 
resistance to Israel, support for Hamas rested on the organisation’s development of, and 
support for, a complex network of community and civil society institutions.
37
 When 
Palestinian and Israeli delegates announced the Oslo Accords in 1993, Hamas rejected them 
and engaged in various acts of resistance. As Milton-Edwards and Farrell argue, Hamas’ 
goals at the time were both to resist and reject Israel and also to undermine the PA.
38
 
However, by 2000, in the context of escalating violence and provocative electioneering,
39
 the 
Oslo process effectively collapsed. Both Hamas’ armed wings and Israel’s occupation forces 
escalated their violent campaigns and the PA effectively lost all control of the situation. 
Despite being militarily overwhelmed by Israel’s re-invasion of the West Bank during the 
second Intifada, Hamas’ network of charity and community welfare organisations proved 
better able to serve the needs of a general population suffering the strains of the violence.
40
 
The PA splintered and many of its security forces fell back onto personal loyalties and 
organised criminality.
41
 It was in this context that the 2006 legislative elections took place.
42
 
 Despite the fact that Hamas achieved an overwhelming victory, there was no smooth 
transition of power. Tensions between the two sides surfaced between March and December 
2006. The situation grew more violent and continued to escalate into early 2007, despite 
Saudi Arabian-sponsored negotiations and an agreement signed on 8 February in Mecca. The 
unity government, established on 17 March, lasted only ninety-nine days, coming to an end 
on 14 June when Hamas cadres seized the headquarters of the Preventative Security Forces in 
Gaza. Fatah forces responded with force in Nablus and Jenin, Abbas dissolved the 
government and declared a state of emergency. He then appointed an emergency government 
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 In the wake of this rift, the PA pursued a new set of objectives: removing the remaining 
structures of Hamas’ influence and ending the plurality of armed force. With international 
support, the PA utilised two main methodologies. The first was to consolidate its primacy 
within Palestinian politics in the West Bank.
44
 The second strategy was to position itself as 
the only possible legitimate government, and its institution-building agenda as the only 
reasonable means to achieving Palestinian independence. This campaign focused primarily 
on the city of Nablus, a site associated with a long history of independent agency and 
resistance, and a stronghold of Hamas in the West Bank. Indeed, during the intifada, Nablus 
had suffered badly under an Israeli siege which banned normal law enforcement activity and 
allowed conditions of lawlessness to proliferate.
45
 
 Thus, with Israeli support and international backing, the PA undertook a military 
‘surge’. It shut down Hamas’ social and civil society infrastructure throughout the West 
Bank, arrested scores of Hamas members and exercised censorship even in mosques. It also 
moved against militant forces of al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades – who are loosely aligned with 
Fatah – though this process was seen to be much more gradual and consensual than the 
campaign against Hamas.
46
 Fayyad, in particular, promoted a view of the future of 
Palestinian politics which essentially precluded political alternatives to the PA. He justified 
the numerous arrests of Hamas members and dissolving Zakat Committees (Islamic charity 
organisations which the PA claimed were associated with fundraising for Hamas) by 
explaining that Hamas had politicised the question of poverty and stressed how the plurality 
of arms had contributed to a situation of lawlessness in Nablus prior to the PA’s takeover.47 
 Fayyad’s influence effectively served as the driver for Palestinian reform and 
statebuilding processes. Fayyad and a group of similarly minded technocrats authored the 
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Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) and subsequent related documents,
48
 with 
guidance from the UK government’s Department for International Development.49 The broad 
thrust of the reform agenda was to institute changes that were supposedly designed to re-
affirm Palestinian political agency. In reality, these changes depended on a huge influx of 
donor aid and integrated parts of the Palestinian security infrastructure into a de facto alliance 
with the US. The PRDP outlined its intended consequences for these changes: “If a 
combination of political progress and an improved security environment accelerates the 
lifting of the occupation regime beyond current expectations, the level of public investment 
and private sector activity could increase significantly.”50 However the PRDP offered little 
detail on the specific methodologies that the PA would employ.
51
  
 It is possible to conclude from these actions that one of the PA’s chief concerns was to 
rebuild its relationship with Israeli and American security and military establishments which 
had broken down in the late 1990s and were completely undermined during the al-Aqsa 
Intifada. In practical terms, this meant that three processes were put into motion: the 
streamlining and re-organisation of Palestinian security forces; the renewal of overt 
operational links with the Israeli military, the US and its allies; and the imposition of order in 
the West Bank, which began with a ‘surge’ in the northern West Bank (Jenin and Nablus) and 
progressed to other cities. It was the last of these that was designed to rid the West Bank of 
the remnants of Hamas as a serious political force in the West Bank, and to enable the PA to 
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The Public Response 
 
 By the end of 2008, as a result of the ‘surge’, the atmosphere within the city of Nablus 
had changed dramatically. The police presence had become virtually ubiquitous within the 
limits imposed on it by Israeli forces. Moreover, the return of both foreign aid and direct 
investment from Palestinian sources allowed a range of infrastructural development projects 
to start, and promotional commercial events to take place. Even in the refugee camps which 
had traditionally been handled at arm’s length due to their distinct legal status, the PA’s 
authority was no longer openly challenged, though the presence of police/security forces was 
not as obvious. Furthermore, based on my own observations at the time, there also appeared 
to be general popular consent toward the PA following its ‘surge’ in the northern West Bank.  
 However, a closer examination of data obtained through field research proved that this 
was not in fact as clear-cut as it might at first appear. In essence, while there was indeed 
strong evidence to suggest popular consent among Nabulsis, both in the form of polling 
results and through more qualitative data provided by field research, this consensus was 
superficial and did not last. In April 2012, polling suggested that the level of popular consent 
for the Fayyad government was slipping overall. Those who perceived the West Bank as safe 
and secure fell from fifty-nine per cent to fifty-one per cent. Further, the positive view of 
Abbas and Fayyad’s leadership dropped from sixty-seven per cent to sixty per cent, and from 
forty-four per cent to thirty-four per cent, respectively.
53
  
 This decline in popularity could be partially explained by proximate causes, such as the 
fiscal crisis of 2011 and the re-emergence of allegations of corruption against senior figures 
within the PA. However, evidence from field research gathered in Nablus during 2008-11 
suggests that the PA’s narrative had never fully been accepted by its constituency. Instead, it 
is more likely that popular consent was in fact tied to the relative improvement in conditions 
since the violence of the al-Aqsa Intifada and the modest achievements of the PA in restoring 
some basic services that had been cut off during Israel’s re-invasion of the West Bank’s main 
cities during the uprising.  
 Data from research interviews conducted in Nablus initially appeared to reveal two 
broad narratives in popular attitudes toward the PA. These narratives can be categorised as 
consensual – suggesting acceptance of the PA’s actions and the status quo – or rejectionist – 
opposition to the PA’s actions and the status quo. However, over time it became clear that 
what distinguished these two were largely superficial factors, and that neither camp endorsed, 
nor necessarily believed, the PA’s legitimising narrative. Rather, both the consensual and 
rejectionist narratives accepted that conditions in Nablus had improved. Nonetheless, both 
main narratives also expressed significant doubt that the PA could achieve its stated goals of 
Palestinian independence, or even a general long-term improvement in conditions through its 
agenda of institution-building. However, a key difference between the two narratives was the 
scope of historical context in which each situated recent events.  
 Examples of such narratives tended to revolve around a general consensus about the 
violent clampdown by the PA’s security services. Such a clamp down was accepted as a 
necessary means through which order and civil responsibility were restored to the city, even 
though allegations of human rights abuses, torture and maltreatment by the security forces 
were well known. It was also generally understood that the PA had collaborated with Israel 
and foreign governments in order to restore order through coercion and the suspension of 
democracy, although the consensus also held that the state of lawlessness that had developed 
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during the Israeli siege warranted such a response. The following examples represent a 
narrow cross-section of research interviews conducted with a total of 82 different 
interviewees across the West Bank during 2008-11. The broader study analysed the impact of 
the PA’s statebuilding agenda in different contexts based primarily on a critical geographic 
variable (i.e. comparing a major urban centre, a large refugee camp and two villages existing 
under direct Israeli occupation). The examples presented here were chosen due to their 
relevance to the question of the PA’s security agenda. This sample was also chosen because, 
being ordinary citizens who were not overtly aligned to either Hamas or Fatah, this group 




 A former civilian police officer – interviewed in Nablus in late 2009 - justified the role 
played by the PA security forces by suggesting that the security forces’ actions should be 
seen as an essential moderating force in extreme circumstances. He stated that the police’s 
role was to “tame people and teach them to respect the law.”55 Moreover, a senior business 
official at the Nablus Chamber of Commerce (interviewed at approximately the same time as 
the police officer) offered similar support for the PA security forces’ actions based on the 
essential need for public order, so that a basis for development could be formed, and upon 
which businesses in Nablus could and should capitalise.
56
 This interviewee’s comments were 
generally in line with the parameters of the PA’s narrative and essentially focused on a range 
of outcomes that had resulted from the activities of the PA security services, particularly the 
improved environment for economic activity. However, this interviewee would not even 
address the particular goal of Palestinian independence directly, instead responding by 
iterating the necessity for a “political solution.”57 Resistance, on the other hand, amounted to 
merely “a personal matter, something that you do in your heart.”58 
 However, not all endorsements of the PA’s security forces’ actions were quite so all- 
encompassing, though they did tend to focus on the same broad parameters to frame their 
narratives. For example, a middle-aged mother who was studying English with a local non-
governmental organisation tied her perspective to personal experiences of hardship under the 
siege and during the period of lawlessness. Nevertheless, unlike the previous two examples, 
this interviewee was particularly focused on Israel’s culpability for creating the harsh 
conditions during the Intifada. She had experienced a military invasion of her home in 2006 
and the arrest and detention of several male relatives on different occasions. She explained 
how, in her opinion, there was no longer an appetite for violent resistance to Israel in Nablus 
as the city had been forced to suffer the wrath of Israeli retaliation. She further remarked that 
there was no longer any real resistance to Israel at all beyond steadfastness, and that people 
were “waiting for the situation to get better”59 as the PA pursued other means towards its 
political goals. However, she admitted that both she and her friends were reluctant to speak 
openly and critically of the security forces out of fear of reprisals.
 
Additionally, her 
statements demonstrated an acceptance of the threat of brutality as part of that daily life: 
“Girls are protected by the police. They are good for family safety - they will beat men for 
harassing families.”60 
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  Interview by the author, 14 December 2009, Nablus. 
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 In a similar vein, a shop owner in central Nablus, who I interviewed frequently 
throughout December 2009, and again in late 2011, was initially strongly supportive of the 
PA. His comments were framed directly by prioritising his family’s interests and he 
expressed support for the PA’s security agenda through the positive impact it had had, 
directly and indirectly, on their welfare. Like the English student, the shop owner framed his 
interpretation of the security situation in direct relation to his family’s experiences. For 
example, during the Intifada, he had stayed away from the city centre whenever there was a 
high risk of fighting because of responsibilities to his family. After the imposition of order by 
the PA security forces, he and his wife felt much safer in the city.
61
 By late 2011, however, 
the shop owner’s attitude was remarkably different. He told me that he was angry with the 
PA leadership because new accusations had emerged about corruption. The shop owner 
expressed some hostility towards the PA as being ultimately responsible for the worsening 
economic climate in the West Bank. Evidently, the combination of alleged corruption at the 
highest level and the worsening conditions for ordinary businesses like his own was enough 
for this informant to feel a kind of detachment from the PA’s agenda that he had not 
expressed previously.  
 Obviously, there are some important distinctions between the perspectives of the 
different interviewees, particularly in terms of the specific extent to which they accepted the 
legitimising narrative of the PA. Clearly the first two interviewees (the former police officer 
and the high ranking member of the Nablus Chamber of Commerce) held a much more 
positive view of the PA than the other two. However, both were speaking from standpoints 
that were closely aligned to the PA because both shared important interests – usually a 
concern for security and stability – in common with the PA. On the other hand, the two other 
interviewees oriented their concerns with more direct reference to their familial 
responsibilities and the welfare of the general public.  
 An alternative, rejectionist account was also apparent. This tended to situate 
interpretations of the PA’s security agenda within a much broader historical context. It 
highlighted the PA’s dependence on the support of foreign governments and the integration 
of the PA’s security agenda with foreign militaries, and implied that the security services had 
prioritised the concerns of those international actors over the interests of the general 
population. In contrast, the narratives of consent stressed that the violent clampdown by the 
PA’s security services was seen as a necessary means through which order and civic 
responsibility were restored to the city. These consensual narratives were thus framed by a 
much narrower reading of history, focusing primarily on events since the end of the Intifada 
and emphasising the immediate benefits of relief from such conflict. In essence, while the 
consensual view stressed the significance of short-term domestic events, the rejectionist view 
embraced a more holistic approach to the situation. 
 The history of the conflict framed the rejectionist narratives and gave more profound 
meaning to both the crackdown on Hamas and the notion of an underlying reciprocal 
relationship between the PA, Israel and other external parties (particularly the US and its 
allies). This can be demonstrated by the account of Abdul Sattar Qassem, a nationally known 
political figure and university professor. Qassem was a harsh critic of the PA since its 
inception because he perceived it to represent elite interests at the expense of Palestinian 
national concerns. According to Qassem, the PA was a compromised institution which helped 
Palestinian elites dominate what amounted to a proxy government for Israeli and US interests 
while the general Palestinian population were disenfranchised. In his view, the violent role 
played by the PA’s security institutions was central to this relationship. He explained that 
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particular figures within the PA’s elite (who he described as “gangsters” 62) used the security 
services as personal armies prior to, and during, the last Intifada. These intra-Palestinian 
conflicts essentially constituted a distraction which was manipulated by Israel and its allies in 
order to weaken the Palestinian resistance to the occupation.
63
  
 According to Qassem, the schism between Hamas and Fatah was always a possible 
outcome of this process and demonstrated a colonial policy of divide and rule.
64
 Moreover, 
the contrasting treatment of Gaza and the West Bank after the schism demonstrated Israel’s 
ability to use Palestinian dependency to manipulate the population of the occupied territories 
through practices of punishment and reward. He stated that, “Israel has created a system of 
dependence for Palestinians wherein we [the Palestinians] are provided with enough to live, 
but not enough to co-ordinate resistance. The PA is [and the PLO was] complicit in this 
throughout Oslo.”65 Qassem further clarified that this was a very real and material economy 
where the PA played a central and enabling role. For example, the sheer quantity of jobs 
available in the security services (comprising approximately half of the total public sector) 
ensured that large numbers of Palestinians remained dependent on the PA security 
infrastructure for their livelihoods. On the other hand, those who made public statements 
critical of the PA and its relationship with Israel could be targets of the PA’s retaliation. 




 Another prominent member of Nablus’ intelligentsia provided a similar analysis to 
Qassem’s. Importantly, this interviewee was based in Nablus’ old city during the siege and 
had experienced a number of threats against himself and his family by armed gangs during 
the period of lawlessness. He then had taken part in the reconstruction effort. Through this 
intimate connection with the damage to the city, he also endured the violence of the siege. He 
viewed the schism and the PA’s imposition of order through a lens that focused on the Israeli 
occupation as the ultimate power in determining the fate of the Palestinians. In this context, 
the PA was, at best, postponing an inevitable Israeli assault. In fact, he stated that an assault 
on Nablus and other cities in the West Bank comparable to the 2008-2009 bombardment of 
Gaza – named by the Israelis as “Operation Cast Lead” – was almost inevitable at some point 
in the future. As he put it, “there is no doubt, what happened in Gaza will happen here. It is 
only a matter of time.”67 
 Another common element in the narratives of the rejectionists was that they accepted 
that, at a basic level, the conditions in Nablus had improved. The interviewees articulating a 
rejectionist narrative also suggested that living conditions in Nablus could potentially 
improve more under the PA. However, all of these suggestions clashed somewhat with the 
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respective logics that each interviewee had employed in describing the current conditions. 
Qassem, for example, repeated a number of times that “history is in a state of flux” 68 
implying that as yet unpredicted factors could have an impact on Israel’s capacity to control 
the Palestinians through the PA. Qassem argued that the Palestinians remained resilient, as 
did the city of Nablus itself. He further noted that throughout its centuries of history, the city 
had suffered strife on many occasions but had survived and flourished. He was particularly 
explicit in his acknowledgement of the efforts of ordinary people to rebuild their lives and 
that, in spite of everything that had happened in Nablus during the invasion, one could derive 
hope from the fact that the damage to the Old City, the symbolic centre of Nablus’ cultural 
heritage, had been repaired through collective efforts. 
 Thus, framed by the disastrous events of the Intifada, the PA was able to restore some 
semblance of order and provision of services. Of course this perspective was not held 
universally, and it is worth noting that in some particular respects the difference between the 
narratives of those rejecting the PA’s rhetoric and those consenting to it, was not that great. 
Although the rejectionists couched their perspectives in a longer-term view of history, they 
also tended to accept the reality that the PA’s ‘surge’ had brought limited short-term 
improvements in basic conditions. Further, for those that had consented to the PA’s rule, 
there was little genuine belief that the goal of independence could be realised. Over time 
these doubts extended even further and the belief in the PA suffered. Even the shop owner – 
who was strongly concerned with stability for the sake of his familial responsibilities – had 





 The PA’s post-2007 security agenda did not, in fact, serve to establish the groundwork 
for effective statebuilding. Rather, as Yezid Sayigh has argued, the alliances between the PA 
and its external sponsors were in fact the main weaknesses in the security programme.
69
 The 
PA’s statebuilding agenda was deeply penetrated by foreign institutions. Furthermore, 
progress towards genuine independence was undermined when political conditions in the US 
and Israel proved unfavourable to constructive political developments, and were harmed 
further by the PA’s evident acceleration towards authoritarianism.70  
 Broadly speaking, the inhabitants of the West Bank were well aware of the 
statebuilding agenda’s limitations and did not accept the PA’s legitimising narrative per se. 
Rather, the effective imposition of order by the PA’s security forces following the schism 
with Hamas was generally accepted because of the relative stability following a profoundly 
traumatic period. However, the PA was unable to capitalise on that immediate period of 
consent by making genuine progress towards independence. On the contrary, Palestinian 
society has grown more fragmented and the gulf between the Palestinian population and its 
leadership has widened. More specifically, the PA leadership was seen as a stooge of Israeli 
and American interests by some interviewees. In their minds, it has worn the rhetoric of a 
democratic and liberal statebuilding project down to an obvious husk. In other words, the 
‘state’ that is being built in the occupied Palestinian territories is one that, as a product both 
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of weak design and a hostile environment, serves established interests while at the same time 
essentially abrogating public accountability.  
 As a final point, it should be noted that while the context faced by the PA statebuilding 
project is exceedingly complex – and it is certainly clear that the odds are very much stacked 
against the emergence of a genuinely democratic form of governance – it does not necessarily 
follow that the only alternative is authoritarianism. Under current circumstances, the PA may 
not be fully capable of basing its claims to legitimacy on either the kind of ‘republicanism’, 
advocated by Barnett,
71
 nor – in the wake of the devastation of the al-Aqsa Intifada – on a 
foundation of revolutionary rhetoric. At the same time, the acceleration of the PA’s 
authoritarian shift was (and is) not inevitable. Greater emphasis on holding the security forces 
to account, avoiding overt politicisation of security and policing agendas and the dialling 
back of statebuilding rhetoric (even if such measures are undertaken imperfectly) may go 
some way to reduce the gulf between the powerful and the powerless in Palestinian society. 
Although such an agenda is unlikely to challenge the pervasiveness of Israel’s occupation or 
make much serious progress towards meaningful liberation, a more unified Palestinian polity 
is much more likely to be capable of withstanding growing pressures from external forces.  
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